The strategy Nehru adopted in the aftermath of the Chinese invasion into Tibet was that of making light of things. Writing to the chief ministers in June 1952, he said: “Variety of circumstances pull India and China towards each other, in spite of differences in form of Government. This is the long pull of geography and history and, if I may add, of the future.”

During his north-east visit the same year, he reaffirmed the same stance: “...there was not the slightest reason to expect any aggression on our north-eastern frontier. A clear thinking will show it is a frightfully difficult task for any army to cross Tibet and the Himalayas and invade India. Apart from this, there was no particular reason why China should think of aggression in this direction.”

The Chinese Prime Minister, Zhou Enlai, visited India in June 1954. Nehru told the chief ministers that the Chinese PM was “particularly anxious for the friendship and cooperation of India”.

India reached an agreement with China by recognising the latter’s claim over Tibet on condition that the Indian trade rights would be respected and autonomy would be given to Tibet. The 1954 treaty embodied Nehru’s famous panchsheel or five principles - respects for each other’s territory, non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality of status and peaceful coexistence.

Nehru responded to the ‘positive gesture’ from China by a return visit the same year. The overwhelming reception that Nehru received made him to write to his friend, Edwina Mountbatten: “I had a welcome in China such as I have in big cities in India, and that is saying something…One million took part on the day of my arrival in Peking. It was not the numbers but their obvious enthusiasm. There appears to be something emotional to it.”

In 1956, Zhou Enlai visited again. The Dalai lama accompanied him this time as a member of the official delegation. The Tibetan leader after somehow escaping from the clutches of the Chinese told Nehru that he wished to flee to India with things remaining harsh in Tibet following the invasion. Nehru advised him to return to Tibet.

To see the developing situation in Tibet for himself, Nehru wished to visit Tibet in 1958. But he was refused. The situation turned tense again as the Chinese government published a map which showed large swathes of lands in India as belonging to China. Tension kept mounting as Zhou Enlai questioned the sanctity of the McMahon line, stating it as a legacy of the British imperialism and, therefore not legal.

Things worsened as Tibet erupted in a revolt in 1959. The rebellion was put down and the monk king fled Tibet and came to India, seeking asylum. Nehru was dithering. But Indira Gandhi was firm that India was morally bound to provide the asylum. She persuaded her father. Nehru acted finally. He, however, assured his chief ministers in October 1959 that though China and India had fallen out there was nothing to get alarmed. At the same time, he warned, “But the basic fact remains that India and China had fallen out and, even though relative peace may continue at the frontier, it is some kind of an armed peace and future appears to be one of continuing tension.”

Sporadic border skirmishes began the same year the Dalai lama arrived in India. Nehru was still convinced that a full-fledged war was most unlikely. However, he opted for a step to protect the interests of India which the Chinese dispensation had least expected. He acted on the proposal of a senior Intelligence official, BN Mullick to sanction the provocative line known as ‘Forward Posts’. It was a pre-emptive move by way of posting detachments at areas along the border which were being claimed by both sides.  It was a fact that the Indian posts moved ahead in 1962 as compared to 1959.

Zhou Enlai came to India again in 1960 to persuade India to refrain from such provocative acts.  He suggested a way out - India should connive with the Chinese border incursions along the western sector of the McMahon line while China would gloss over India’s penetration along the eastern sector of the disputed frontiers.

Clashes broke out in July 1962 between the two troops along the western sector and later on the eastern borders. The Corps Commander, of Corps-IV that was raised to counter the Chinese challenge, Umrao Singh, received command from Nehru to ‘throw out’ the Chinese in September 1962. Singh pleaded for time. Nehru rejected the plea and replaced Singh with BM Kaul. Kaul took over the Corps-IV on 3 October. Disaster followed.