As the post-election analysis suggests, dissatisfaction and disappointment with Rajapaksa’s authoritarian style and family-based rule led to consolidation of minority votes and steady desertion from his ranks
Maithripala Sirisena became the seventh President of Sri lanka by defeating Mahinda Rajapaksa in the presidential elections held on January 8. Until November 21, 2014, Sirisena’s name did not figure in the list of probables who could take on Mahinda Rajapaksa in the presidential election. Therefore, nomination of Maithripala Sirisena, then Health Minister in Rajapaksa’s Cabinet and General Secretary of the Sri lanka Freedom Party (SlFP), as common Opposition candidate and his subsequent victory in the presidential elections caught all external onlookers by surprise.
As the post-election analysis suggests, dissatisfaction and disappointment with Rajapaksa’s authoritarian style and family-based rule led to consolidation of minority votes and steady desertion from his ranks. As the combined Opposition agreed to field Sirisena as the common candidate, there was a shift of majority Sinhalese votes too away from Rajapaksa. looking at the countrywide move against his regime, Rajapaksa could neither manoeuvre the process of election to his advantage, nor stage a coup as he was allegedly contemplating after the news of his loss trickled in. This article tries to analyse the factors that led to the win, and tries to understand the trajectory of political transformation Sri lanka would take after the elections.
Consolidation of minority votes
The 2015 presidential elections saw a higher voter turnout (81.52%) than that of 2010 (74.5%). Out of 1,50,44,490 registered electors, 1,22,64,377 cast their votes, out of which 1,21,23,452 were considered valid. Sirisena secured 62,17,162, which was 4,49,072 votes more than Rajapaksa (57,68,090).
If these figures are to be compared, it clearly emerges that the Tamils and the Muslim votes played an important role in Sirisena’s win. Sirisena got 9,78,111 votes from North and East compared to Rajapaksa’s 3,23,600. Sirisena also beat Rajapaksa in Kandy and Nuwara Eliya in Central Sri lanka, dominated by Indian origin Tamils. In rest of the Sinhala majority provinces (North Central, North West, South, West, Sabaragamuwa and Uva), Rajapaksa secured more votes (47,41,686) than Sirisena (43,53,524). But for consolidation of minority votes, Sirisena would have been outvoted by Rajapaksa. Retrospectively speaking, the present election also proves the point that if the Tamils would not have boycotted the 2005 election, Rajapaksa might have found it difficult to win.
Interestingly, some sections of the Tamils contemplated boycotting 2015 election too. But their voices were rather muted. True, Tamil National Alliance (TNA), unlike other Opposition parties, did not commit its support to Sirisena prior to the elections. TNA was also not happy about the common programme worked out by the Opposition, which ignored Tamil demands. However, in the face of the Opposition wave against Rajapaksa, it was highly unlikely for the Tamils to leave this chance of throwing Rajapaksa out of power. Moreover, the TNA did not call for a boycott with the hope that defeat of Rajapaksa would open up new avenues for Tamil politics.
As Sirisena rode the wave of a popular movement against Rajapaksa, two main Muslim political parties — the All Ceylon Makkal Congress (ACMC) and the Sri lankan Muslim Congress (SlMC) — could not stay unaffected by the call for change. They also decided to resign from Rajapaksa’s Cabinet and support Sirisena. Muslims had their own grievances against the Rajapaksa Government for turning a blind eye to increasing attacks against Muslims by Buddhist extremist groups.
In fact, rumours had it that Rajapaksa brothers were covertly encouraging and sponsoring these extremists. They did not leave Rajapaksa in a hurry because Muslim leaders have over time preferred to ally with the party in power to protect their interests. However, in the face of change, they too decided to shift their loyalty and join the Opposition. There were moments of indecision in SlMC, but finally, on December 27, 2014, rank and file of the party — except a small section — decided to back Sirisena. The consolidation of Muslim votes was apparent in the pro-Sirisena wave in the Muslim areas in the East.
Not quitting the SlFP helped Sirisena
Another important move by Sirisena was his decision not to quit his parent party, Sri lanka Freedom Party, even when he stood for election against Rajapaksa. This provided an opportunity for cadres of SlFP to vote for change in favour of him without compromising their loyalty to the party. Their displeasure with the authoritarian style of Mahinda and his brothers must have made them vote in favour of Sirisena.
Attempts to manipulate the election foiled
There was a strong view in Sri lanka that the Rajapaksas would do everything possible to ensure Mahinda Rajapaksa’s win and manipulate institutions of the state in that direction. According to People’s Action for Free and Fair Election (PAFFREl), Sri lankan election watchdog, abuse of state resources for election purposes in 2015 presidential elections increased significantly compared to the 2010 elections. There were 150 violations relating to the abuse of state power, resources and misuse of state sector employees for election purposes during the first 35 days of the pre-election period, compared to 53 incidents in 2010 over a period of 68 days.
However, the Election Department took care to conduct the election in a fairly peaceful manner despite the fact that there were 328 complaints. Keeping the popular resentment against Rajapaksa in view, the Election Commissioner, who was allegedly known for his pro-Rajapaksa biases, was perhaps compelled to play his due role on the election day. The Army chief too acted in a responsible manner when the final results started coming in showing a clear lead for Sirisena. There were reports in the lankan media that, the Army chief refused to oblige Mahinda when the latter asked him to step in and annul the election results. Mahinda also reportedly called in other high-ranking officials like the Election Commissioner and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to his official residence at Temple Trees, and persuaded them unsuccessfully to back emergency intervention by the Army. But none of them was ready to oblige Mahinda Rajapaksa, the falling star.
Challenges and opportunities ahead
Immediately after his win, Sirisena promised to fulfil his electoral promises. However, it seemed difficult for him to manage a huge coalition with divergent interests and ideologies. Some analysts also feared that Rajapaksa’s strong support base, particularly among the Sinhalese population in the South, might be used to obstruct Sirisena’s policies.
Nevertheless, Sirisena has begun well. He has set up a hundred days’ agenda and seems to be heading in the right direction. He has appointed UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe as the Prime Minister, and set up a national executive committee to discuss ways of implementing the 100-day programme. He seems to be moving ahead smoothly to replace the executive presidency Sri lanka has witnessed since 1978 with a mixed or dual executive with a President having limited powers and a Prime Minister, as head of the Cabinet with augmented powers.
On matters concerning foreign policy, the focus of the National Unity Government has been to assuage fears of the international community of their tilt towards China under Rajapaksa, and mend relations with India, USA and the EU. There is a political will now to engage and cooperate with the United Nations on the issue of violation of human rights and war crimes during the last phase of Eelam War. The Sri lankan Foreign Minister has already paid his maiden visit to India and assured all concerned about the policy shifts in the right direction. President Sirisena is expected to visit India in February. Sri lankan diplomats in the West and multilateral bodies are seen to be reverting to a more accommodative and nuanced posture on issues pertaining to Sri lanka.
On Tamil issues, the first signs of a thaw are visible, as Sirisena addressed the immediate concerns of the Tamils in the North, by appointing a civilian Governor, assuring them of taking measures to resettle the displaced people, release political prisoners, reassess the issue of land-rights, and investigate the cases of disappearances. The lifting of ban on transport of commodities to the North and East has been well received by the Tamils. However, much of what Sirisena would do to bring about a lasting political reconciliation remains unknown.
One should not forget that he has the unique advantage of support from an important section of the SlFP and the main Opposition party, the UNP, apart from other political parties, to deliver on his promises. Sri lankan people have voted for change and there is a hope that the new President will lead the country in the right direction. Sirisena has a unique opportunity to prove himself.
(Gulbin Sultana is Research Assistant with South Asia Centre, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. The views expressed here are her own)
