Afghanistan’s real challenge begins now
With US-led Nato forces formally ending their 13-year-long combat mission in Afghanistan, the country now moves into a new era, marked by uncertainty and fears of instability. There is no telling how the security situation will evolve. The Afghan forces are now in-charge, but though they have been trained by some of the world's best military forces, India included, they remain woefully ill-equipped. Yes, they have, on many occasions, bravely defended their positions and managed to hold their own; however, only time will tell if they’ll be able to fend off the bigger challenges that lie ahead. Already, the Taliban has upped the ante and taken back areas, such as in the Helmand Province, from where it had previously been flushed out. Terror attacks have been on the rise in recent months, with even heavily fortified foreign enclaves coming under fire. Though it is unlikely that the Taliban will return to Kabul to rule all over the country, the group will possibly take back more of its old strongholds.
To that extent, the situation may worsen in the immediate future — a major concern not just for Afghanistan but all regional players. From India's point of view, the big question is: Will the change in Afghanistan's security equation impact the flow of jihadis into KashmirIJ The answers to almost all of Afghanistan's security questions will primarily be determined by two factors: First, the kind of support that the international community continues to provide Afghanistan and second, the impact of and response to Pakistan's policies in that country. In the first case, it is comforting to note that about 13,500 foreign soldiers will remain in Afghanistan, as part of a larger post-war rebuilding programme called Resolute Support. \
Though this is a far cry from the 1,40,000 foreign troops stationed in the country at the height of the war in 2009, it is still a fairly big contingent — to the extent, that some in the West have wondered if the end-of-combat announcement was merely ceremonial. The contingent has also been empowered to do its job: A recent change in the US-Afghanistan bilateral security agreement, for example, allows foreign troops to engage in counter-terrorism operations. In the second case, Pakistan can be expected to continue supporting terror groups in the hopes of securing strategic depth in Afghanistan. How Kabul negotiates with Islamabad on this issue and to what extent the international community pressures Pakistan to correct its course is still unclear. Another important element in the Afghan transition process is the National Unity Government in Kabul. Headed by two erstwhile rivals who are bound by a vaguely-worded power-sharing agreement, it is hardly a stabilising force in itself. Nevertheless, given that the flow of international aid is almost entirely dependent on how this Government functions, the new leaders might just work together long enough for the Afghan polity to mature in the post-Karzai era.
